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1. Is ethics a part of personal knowledge 
and can there be an objective knowledge  
of ethical rules?  
Ethics has usually been considered as the domain of the 
intrinsic personal belief. Some even claimed that no 
objective knowledge of ethics is possible [1]. We propose 
a quite new way of approaching the problem. Although 
ethics as a part of the personal belief cannot be examined 
scientifically, the claim that it is not possible to study 
ethical rules as means of strategy choice is false. The 
model we bring forward handles the role of ethical rules 
from the perspective of evolutionary fitness [2].  
Individuals act within a certain society, which is influ-
enced rather by cultural “memes” than by individually 
gained experience. Psychologists would claim that an 
individual is a necessary source of any changes in culture, 
because of his/her creative capabilities. From evolutionary 
perspective such creations are, however, merely mutations 
in the memotype of the culture. These mutations are 
subject to selection processes, which do not depend on 
personal characteristics of individuals but rather on the 
fitness to the widely understood environment. This envi-
ronment includes the material world, for which fitness of a 
cultural “meme” means “empirical truth”, as well as the 
cultural environment, for which the term fitness of a cultural 
“meme” refers to logical coherence with other “memes”.  
Evolutionary approach provides a researcher with sev-
eral advantages: 
it is possible to abstract from individual psychological 
aspects 
it is possible to observe objective development of a 
social system 
it is possible to study the influence of ethical criteria of 
choice on the social behavior 
it is possible to ask the question concerning what objec-
tive aspects of ethics can be studied 
prospectively it is possible to study how different ethical 
rules evolve and the way they result from the state of the 
“world” and the way they influence on it. 
Such evolutionary approach seems to be the only rational 
way to evaluate intersubjective rules of ethics.  
2. Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) 
From philosophical perspective DAI is a cognitive system 
in which knowledge is possession of a whole system 
(population of individuals in the case of MAS – Multi Agent 
Systems). An individual is merely a carrier of such knowl-
edge (or a part of it). Such approach lets us treat the 
agents in the way similar to biological individuals, which 
are subject to natural selection. Only two possibilities are 
open to an agent: it may die or survive in confrontation 
with its environment, which consists of two components: 
the “social” (other agents) and the “material” (the world, in 
which the agent acts). The real influence of selection rules 
on knowledge is seen only on the level of the population, 
where strategies are made temporarily stable. On this level 
advantageous features are strengthened and disadvanta-
geous mutations are eliminated. Such evolutionary game 
takes place between the whole society (population) and 
the environment. Thus the way the population acts is more 
important than the fate of an individual. Intelligence as the 
adaptive means should reveal this feature. As Weiß [3], 
one of the prominent persons in DAI research, points out: 
“intelligence is deeply and inevitably connected with inter-
action”.  
The practical realization of computer simulation of MAS 
looks as follows: 
An agent is a part of computer code (program), which is 
able to act individually within its environment. There is no 
general definition of an agent but it is assumed that it has 
to possess learning capability, ability to create an internal 
model of its environment and the ability to choose the 
strategy of acting within its environment, based upon a 
certain (for the time being, a priori given, in the future 
perhaps self-modifiable) system of goals. 
An agent may act socially, creating temporal or stable 
structures of cooperation with other agents, which may 
result in specialization in certain actions. This may lead to 
more complex structures – aggregates of agents – for 
which the question of self-organization arises. This is not, 
however, the case of suggested simulation, although the 
problem of emerging of such structures is interesting in 
itself. 
The agent has two fundamental goals: to survive and to 
reproduce. The process of agent’s reproduction may be 
enriched by the crossing-over mechanism which allows for 
faster changes and thus increases the population’s 
flexibility. 
The agent has to be able to recognize other agents 
especially those which belong to his own population as 
potential partners for cooperation. 
The selection mechanisms act on individual agents 
through mechanisms of strengthening and elimination of 
“unsuccessful” agents. The observations, however, are 
concentrated on the whole population rather than on 
individual agents. The intelligence of the system is ana-
lyzed in the light of effectiveness of the population in 
performing the desired actions. This is independent of the 
goals of individual agents, which are written into agents’ 
“profiles”.  
One thing concerning the observations is also important. 
The suggested simulation lets us avoid a certain question 
about the position of the observer, who in the case of 
human societies is just a member of the society it 
examines. In the simulated population the place of the 
observer is external and, in a way, God-like. He/she is 
maybe not almighty but able to posses the complete 
knowledge of the system. 
The more detailed discussion of the agent’s profile is 
presented in the parts 4, 5 and 6 of the present paper. Let 
us only state here that suggested by some authors 




(Tuomela [4]) joint intentions or any other attempts to 
implement intentionality or self-consciousness into the 
agent’s profile lie far beyond the scope of our interest. 
There are two fundamental reasons. Firstly, we are not 
interested in getting the “human-like” society – with all 
psychological colorfulness of its participants – but rather 
the society that acts according to clear rules resulting from 
what philosophers are able to say about scientific cognition 
and ethics. Secondly, the evolutionary approach allows for 
treatment of psychological factors as irrelevant to the 
knowledge and the rules of acting, which are gained by the 
whole population.  
3. Methodology – why simulate  
ethical behaviors? 
The motivation for simulating ethics in computer environ-
ment comes from two reasons. The first lies in computer 
practice where safety of a computer network depends 
upon the ability to meet the challenge produced by various 
negative actions taken by the users (like hackers) and the 
programs (viruses for instance). The other is purely cog-
nitive. Computer simulations offer a clean (fully controlled) 
environment, in which it is possible to test certain philo-
sophical concepts in their formal “unpolluted” (for instance 
by psychological factors) form. Of course one would claim 
that purely formal, logical analysis should be enough in 
such cases. This, however, is not true for the concepts 
based upon evolutionary approach, where purely deter-
ministic predictions are not possible. The world of culture 
evolution is complex. Studying evolution requires observ-
ing multiple generations, which in the case of real (human) 
society is impossible for purely biological reasons. This, 
however, does not apply to the societies simulated in 
computer environment.  
Simulation requires simplification. The agents are able to 
learn and observe their environment and produce the 
world view. They possess knowledge, or being more 
precise, their beliefs are identical to the available informa-
tion about the objects. This knowledge is personal but 
objective and it is a basis for decision taking. However, 
until now, the agents used to possess only intellectual 
capability (intellectual profile) – the ability to rationally 
analyze the situation. We suggest implementing two 
additional “profiles” – social and ethical – the former being 
responsible for the observations of the social environment, 
the latter corresponding to the rules governing evaluation 
of what is good or bad. Let us, notice that the core 
evaluation of being good or bad refers to the observable 
internal states of an “agent”. Those states determine the 
agent’s fitness to the environment thus deciding on the 
agent’s chance to survive.  
4. Ethically-social approach to behavior 
estimation of an autonomic agent on the 
ground of M-agent architecture 
The proposed way to develop intelligent machines by 
creating “social” machines is the closest to reality if one 
assumes that intelligence resulted from the evolution and 
not by miraculous act of creation. The concept is based on 
the socio-biological theory that primate intelligence first 
evolved because of the need to deal with social interac-
tions. The model is based on M-agent architecture intro-
duced in [5], [6]. 
The main idea of the ethically-social estimation of an 
autonomic agent’s behavior is to provide the agent with 
two additional profiles: the ethical and the social. The 
ethical profile would cover operations that aim at: 
construction of „notion” about oneself on basis of one’s 
ethical rules, 
fulfillment of one’s ethical rules, 
updating and learning the ethical rules on the basis of 
the environment observation, particularly of those 
environment elements which are agents. 
The group of goals, decisions, operations and knowledge 
relating to social live mechanisms is named the social 
profile. This will perform the operations that aim at: 
fulfillment of living together rules in society, 
observation of environment, especially agents, 
„punishing” the agents, that do not fulfill rules of living 
together. 
The motto, which inspired formulating of such a solution is 
taken from [7]: “There is no society without morality”. Any 
human being taking decision about his/her action is also 
influenced by the ethical rules he/she knows. The effects 
of this action are, however, observed through other indi-
viduals in society, who suitably, according to the social 
norms known to them, react on such behavior. The human 
being obviously watches those reactions and, if the 
reactions indicate his „bad” behavior, he changes his own 
ethical norms. Society has an indirect impact on the ethical 
system of such individual. 
The social and ethical profiles are inseparable and 
mutually supplementary. Social profiles of agents from the 
environment are an indirect influence on the ethical profile 
of the agent concerned, as it was shown in the last 
paragraph. Only thanks to these two profiles it is available 
to keep social and moral order in open systems, and thus 
to create mechanisms similar in safety to the ones well 
functioning in known societies. 
 
Figure 1. Concept of social, ethical and intellectual 
profiles in M-agent architecture. 
5. Social profile 
The social profile forms the class of the agent’s activity, 
which as its goal has the observation of other agents in the 
society and of other elements of the environment. Those 
observations should be done in order to distinguish 
individuals, which do not fulfill social and ethical rules and 
whose behavior is unfavorable, incorrect or bad according 
to the observer. The „bad” individuals should be ade-




quately treated (e.g. convicted, avoided) which should be 
performed by the social profile. 
6. Ethical profile 
The ethical profile is the class of agent activity, which as its 
goal has the fulfillment of one’s ethical rules and updating 
or learning the ethical rules on the basis of the environ-
ment observation, particularly of those environment ele-
ments which are agents.  
The operator of agent’s ethical learning enables to 
change the ethical norms in order to be „better” treated in 
the society. 
7. What can be simulated? 
Let us first sketch the general scheme of relations between 
the agent’s profiles [see Figure 2]  
 
Here: 
The input is firstly dispersed into ethical, rational (intellec-
tual) and social streams. 
Ethical, rational (intellectual) and social profiles could be 
interrelated. 
The output is a decision based upon a function of ethical, 
rational and social worldviews. 
Figure 2. General scheme of relations between agent’s 
profiles 
 
The above scheme must be filled with certain realistic 
assumptions on various ethical models present in cultural 
tradition: 
7.1 Ethics of moral law 
 
Ethics of moral law is externally given and implemented in 
the E profile by the programmer and unmodifiable during 
the evolution. This would correspond to the ethics of 
natural law. The feedbacks go only from the ethical profile. 
Let us notice that it allows for simulating the behavior 
according to various sets of natural laws posing the 
programmer in God’s place. 
7.2 Ethics of prize and punishment  
 
Feedbacks here go bilaterally. They let the agent to modify 
its ethical worldview according to benefits achieved. 
Possibility of interaction between the social and ethical 
profiles is noteworthy here. This is, however restricted to 
the individual fitness of an agent. 
7.3 “Cynics” ethics 
 
The ethical profile is subdued to other profiles, which is 
realized by implementing the null starting profile. Ethical 




rules are constructed upon the changeable information 
coming from social and rational profile 
7.4 Moral duty ethics 
 
The feedback from the social profile dominates over the 
one from the ethical profile. The social rules form the 
shape of the ethical picture of the world, which is inde-
pendent from rational evaluation 
7.5 Null ethics 
 
No ethical profile is implemented or allowed in future. 
It is possible to perform simulation of a single model or 
combine different models in a single simulation, which 
allows to compare the influence of several or even all 
profiles on fitness, which gives a competitive situation.  
8. What can we learn from such simulations 
It is obvious that one should not expect learning anything 
about actually existing societies[8]. The purity and control-
lable characteristics of the simulation allows, however, 
investigating: 
the impact of ethics on fitness of social groups, 
the differences between the fitness of different models of 
ethics 
the time dependent development of ethics in its social 
aspect 
Concluding one can have the first “empirical” means to 
study social states in their theoretically (philosophically) 
constructed forms.  
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